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be measured by another standard not under the control of the 
state and which may be subject to change, does not amount to 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. [ Cita-
tions.] " (See, also, Paler-mo v. Stockton Theatr-es, Inc. 
(1948), snpr-a, 32 Cal.2d 53, 59.) 
I agree that the United Nations Charter, as presently con-
stituted and accepted was not intended to, and does not, 
supersede existing domestic legislation of the United States 
or of the several states and territories. 
I would hold that provisions of the Alien Land Law here 
invoked by the State of California do not contravene either 
the federal or state Constitutions; and would affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6170. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1952.] 
HAROLD A. KLETT, Appellant, v. SECURITY ACCEPT-
ANCE COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Interest-Usury-Evidence.-Defendant's testimony that he 
told plaintiff he would charge him 1 per cent a month for 
the privilege of having his furniture in plaintiff's store, and 
plaintiff's testimony that he was to pay defendant such charge 
for the "privilege of having that ... flooring," together with 
references in plaintiff's testimony to his "ten per cent equity" 
in the furniture as to which defendant finance company was 
advancing 90 per cent of the wholesale price, support an 
implied finding of the jury that the 1 per cent charge was 
intended by the parties not as interest but as compensation 
for the arrangement under which plaintiff, without substan-
tial capital or credit, was enabled to start and carry on a 
furniture business. 
[2] !d.-Usury-Transactions Embraced-Sales Contracts.-Sales 
of conditional sales contracts between plaintiff and his retail 
customers to defendant finance company at discounts of about 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Interest, § 10; Am.Jur., Interest, § 21. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Interest, § 44; [2] Interest, § 31; 
[3] Evidence, §116; [4, 7, 9] Interest, §40; [5, 8, 11] Interest, 
§ 45; [6] Trust Receipts; [10] Interest,§ 31.1; [12] Trover, § 6; 
[13] Pawn and Personal Property Brokers,§ 6; [14] Trover,§ 39; 
[15] Appeal and Error, § 1524-1. 
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17 per cent, while part of a usurious scheme if made for the 
sole purpose of evading the usury laws by giving the finance 
company a usurious profit on its loans to plaintiff, are not part 
of such a scheme where they are bona fide sales of property, 
are without recourse against plaintiff or his partner, and are 
transactions made at plaintiff's request. 
[3] Evidence-Presumptions-Value.-Since it is a matter of 
common knowledge that many retailers customarily discount 
conditional sales contracts and many finance companies pur-
chase them, there is no presumption that the market value of 
tho~e contracts was their face value. 
[4] Interest-Usury-Instructions.-A formula instruction that 
"if you find that the relationship existing between plaintiff 
and defendants herein was that of borrower and lender, insofar 
as the transactions occurring between the plaintiff and 
defendants evidenced by trust receipts are concerned, and you 
find that said transactions were in fact loans of money, and 
you further find that as a condition of making such loans the 
defendants required the plaintiff to sell to said defendants at 
less than their reasonable, fair market value time contracts 
covering the sale of furniture by plaintiff to plaintiff's cus-
tomers, then you must find that ... the amount under the 
reasonable, fair market value that each time contract was dis-
counted is to he considered interest" is properly refused, for 
the mere fact that a borrower may have been required to enter 
into an unprofitable contract as a condition to a loan of money 
would not itself make the loan usurious. 
[5] !d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Any error in not 
allowing plaintiff to prove the fair market value of conditional 
sales contracts which he sold to defendant finance company 
at discounts of about 17 per cent is not prejudicial to plaintiff 
where the jury impliedly found on ample evidence and suffi-
cient instructions that defendants did not require the sale of 
the contracts as a condition of making loans to plaintiff. 
[6] Trust Receipts--Nature.--Trust receipts are a method of 
securing a debt and not of creating a debt; there can be no 
such thing as a security intPrest which secures no obligation. 
[7] Interest-Usury-Instructions.-In an action to recover usuri-
ous interest alleged to havP been paid in connection with a 
series of loans, instructions are erroneous which imply that 
trust receipt transactions and loans are, respectively, inhe-
rently and necessarily exclusive of each other and which advise 
the jury that "If the transactions . . . were trust receipt 
[6] Sec Cal.Jur., Trust Receipts, § 3; Am.Jur., Trust Receipts, 
§ 2. 
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transactions and not loans, then the question of interest is 
not involved." 
[8] !d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-Plaintiff suing to re-
cover usurious interest is not prejudiced by instructions which 
erroneously assume that a trust receipt transaction and a 
usurious loan are mutually exclusive concepts where such 
instructions were conditioned on the jury's finding that the 
trust receipt transactions in question were bona fide and to 
secure the flooring of furniture in plaintiff's store and not 
to conceal or secure any hidden agreement for the mere pay-
ment of interest; and where the other instructions given make 
it clear that the ultimate issue actmilly to be decided was not 
whether the transactions were trust receipts or loans, but 
whether the loans, or the transactions by whatever name they 
might be called, were or were not usurious. 
[9] Id.-Usury-Instructions.-In an action to recover usurious 
interest alleged to have been paid in connection with a series 
of loans, it is proper to give an instruction, at defendants' 
request, that a lender is not prohibited from charging an extra 
and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or 
risk additional to the lawful interest, other than for the loan 
of money; that he may make a reasonable charge for investi-
gating, negotiating, brokering, making, servicing, collecting 
and enforcing· his obligation; and that such items must be 
confined to specific service or expense incidental to the loan 
incurred in such a way as to preclude its being a device through 
which additional interest or profit on the loan may be exacted. 
[10] Id.- Usury- Exemptions.- Legitimate charges for specific 
items of actual service and expense are not compensation for 
the loan of money within the meaning of the usury law ( Const., 
art. XX, § 22) ; such charges are not interest. 
[11] !d.-Usury-Appeal-Harmless Error.-In an action to re-
cover usurious interest alleged to have been paid in connection 
with a series of loans, admission in evidence, over plaintiff's 
objection, of statement of trust receipt financing which may 
be filed by an en truster with the Secretary of State ( Civ. 
Code, § 3016.9) is not prejudicial to plaintiff where such state-
ment is merely some evidence that defendant finance company 
intended to loan money to plaintiff on the security of trust 
receipts, and he himself pro_ved the fact. 
[12] Trover-What Constitutes Conversion.--Taking of personal 
property is not a conversion where such act is done with the 
consent of the complaining party. 
[13] Pawn and Personal Property Brokers-Statutes Governing.-
Personal Property Brokers Act (Stats. 1909, p. 969, as 
amended) does not apply to bona fide conditional sales con-
tracts or "flooring contracts." 
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[14] Trover-Appeal-Harmless Error.-On appeal from a judg-
ment for defendants in an action for conversion of furniture, 
plaintiff may not complain of the rejection of evidence offered 
by him to prove the extent of his damages where the jury 
found against him on the issue of liability and did not reach 
the issue of damages. 
[15] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Jury-Delibera-
tion.-lVIere fact that jury returned to court after 25 minutes' 
deliberation with a signed separate verdict on each of two 
counts does not show that there has been a miscarriage of 
justice. ( Const., art. VI, § 4lj2.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for recovery of usurious interest and penalties, and 
for conversion of furniture. Judgment for defendants af-
firmed. 
Horace E. Dunning for Appellant. 
-Wilke & Fleury, H. Nelson French, Sherman C. Wilke 
and Gordon A. Fleury for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment, entered 
pursuant to a jury verdict for defendants, in this action for 
the recovery of usurious interest and penalties and for the 
conversion of certain furniture. 'vVe have concluded that no 
prejudicial error or miscarriage of justice is shown and that, 
in accord with the mandate of section 4¥2 of article VI of 
the state Constitution, the judgment should be affirmed. Be-
cause, however, there was errm: in instructing the jury, it is 
necessary to quote, or to epitomize in some detail, a substantial 
amount of the evidence to show that the error was not preju-
dicial. 
Some of the testimony of plaintiff, such as that in reference 
to the circumstances of his meeting Mr. Parker and the events 
immediately preceding his dealings with defendants, scarcely 
seems material to either cause of action but since plaintiff evi-
dently thought that these matters were important and the 
jury heard them from plaintiff's lips, mention of them is made. 
The jury may have felt that the evidence threw some light on 
plaintiff's circumstances, his business methods, and the na-
ture of his dealings with defendants. 
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The Usury Canse of .Action 
Plaintiti, in November, 1945, was a furniture salesman 
employed by the Standard .F'urniture Company in Sacra-
mento; he decided that he wished to go into the furniture 
business on his own account. He had met a Mr. Parker, 
''the first time the day I came from Stockton to the Sacra-
mento Alcoholics Anonymous Club, and we became friends 
through our work together, and in that philosophy we follow 
in Alcoholics Anonymous.'' Mr. Parker ''used to come to the 
store" where plaintiff was employed; further, according to 
plaintiff's testimony, Mr. Parker said "he would like to go 
into the furniture business with me here. This conversation 
possibly went on for two or three months.'' Plaintiff and 
Mr. Parker then, on November 13, 1945, orally agreed to form 
a partnership and on that date plaintiff left his employment 
with the Standard :B~urniture Company. Plaintiff testified, 
"I told Mr. Parker that I was unable to go into business 
as far as finances were concerned . . . I said, 'I will consider 
going in business with yon if you will put up the money 
against my experience ... ' ... At that time he said he 
would arrange for twenty five hundred dollars, and not very 
long after he would have twenty five hundred dollars more. 
I said, 'It would be useless to go in for less than five thousand 
dollars at this time.' " On November 29, 1945, Mr. Parker 
"put up one thousand dollars" and on December 4, five 
hundred dollars. Parker advanced no more money. In the 
meantime, plaintiff testified, he expected a Dr. Leiser to pur-
chase a storeroom and rent it to plaintiff; on the strength of 
his expectations of getting a location and the capital which 
Mr. Parker had promised, plaintiff made buying trips to San 
:B'rancisco and Los Angeles and purchased several thousand 
dollars worth of furniture ; he also purchased a used automo-
bile. 
Plaintiff testified, ''there wasn't any use in trying to es-
tablish a credit. . . . I told the manufacturers we would pay 
for this merchandise when it was delivered, or before it was 
delivered ... I was to notify them for future delivery." 
After the first $1,000 was advanced by Parker, plaintiff paid 
for some of the furniture he had ordered, paid $150 for a 
sales tax bond, and paid for the used automobile. 
Plaintiff then discovered that Dr. I~eiser had not purchased 
the building which he (plaintiff) had expected Dr. Leiser 
to purchase and lease to the new partnership, and, having 
no storeroom, plaintiff caused the furniture he had purchased 
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to be placed in storage with Western Van & Storage Com-
pany. He then noticed (about December 2, 1945) that a 
building near the one which he had expected Dr. Leiser to 
purchase appeared to be empty; plaintiff contacted the owner, 
who at first was not interested in plaintiff as a tenant; how-
ever, although the owner would not enter into a lease he 
finally agreed to permit the new partnership to rent the build-
ing on a month to month basis on condition, suggested by 
plaintiff, that the latter ''would give his son a position.'' 
Upon this agreement plaintiff caused the stored furniture to 
be moved into the rented building on or about December 4 or 5. 
Mr. Parker put up the $500 above mentioned on December 4 
and this sum went for "payment of rent and telephone 
fleposits, gas and electricity deposits, and the general conduct 
of the business, and repairs. We had to put a floor in our 
store.'' 
Plaintiff repeatedly asked Mr. Parker for more money but 
Mr. Parker said it vvas not available. On December 4, 1945, at 
plaintiff's request, defendant Kenneth Forrest, vice-president 
of defendant finance company, met plaintiff at the latter's 
home. Plaintiff, while an employe of Standard, had seen Mr. 
Forrest in the Standard store. Concerning their meeting on 
December 4, plaintiff testified, ''I told him . . . that I was 
having difficulty and that difficulty was in getting enough 
capital to start this business. And I told him that Raymond 
Parker and I had agreed to go in business; and I told him 
it didn't look like I was going to get very far on this new 
store without some financial assistance. 
''I ash:ed him if his company would be interested in any 
way in helping me finance this business. . . . vV e discussed 
fnrnitnre contracts, and the sale of furniture. And I told him 
that if he wonld help me at this time, in this way of financing-
or flooring, 1 that I wonld be able to give him a good deal of 
onr sales contract bnsiness.2 • • • And we dwelled a great 
(I eal on the plan we had been llsing [?] If he decided to do 
so, how we wonld sell onr furniture contracts to him and his 
1 The term ''flooring,'' as it is used in this case, was explained to 
the .jury in the following instruction (given at plaintiff's request) : 
"Merchnndise is 'floored' when it is financed under a trust receipt or 
simila.r title retention document, whereby a retail dealer obtains pos-
session of tl1e same from a distrihutor for exhibition and sale through 
payment to f1istrilmtor by a hank or other financing agency.'' 
2 The "sales contract business" referred to by plarntiff is the 
sale at a discount of conditional sales contracts between plaintiff and 
his retail customers. 
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firm And before he left my home he told me that he 
would go along with us after knowing the structure that we 
had at this time to the extent of five thousand dollars; and 
that I would have to floor, or finance with them only the major 
pieces of furniture. The smaller items he would not be inter-
ested in because it would be hard to keep track of. . . . He 
said 'I will go along to five thousand dollars worth of flooring 
or financing.' '' 
Plaintiff and Kenneth Forrest arranged a meeting on De-
cember 5 with Kenneth's father, president of defendant fi-
nance company, and plaintiff's partner, Parker. At this 
meeting, plaintiff testified, the elder Mr. Forrest "told me 
that they would put 90 per cent into these purchases and 
that we would pay one per cent a month on the flooring, 
and that this merchandise would be paid off individually 
from these trust receipts3 that I signed later as we sold the 
merchandise and delivered it .... If the merchandise was 
on the floor for a period of thirty days we were to pay him 
one per cent a month for that privilege of having that, or 
whatever you want to call it, that flooring; but had the 
merchandise been sold before that time-for example, i:f mer-
chandise would come in on the first of the month, and we 
sold it on the fifth of the month, we were also instructed that 
we were to pay one per cent at that time." 
It is apparent from plaintiff's testimony as above quoted 
that he was asking for, and received, something more than a 
mere loan of money or credit for interest. He admitted that 
he had no credit and that it would be useless for him to try 
to establish credit. He was asking the defendants to finance 
his business; to do almost the very thing, short of becoming 
a partner, which Parker had agreed to do but had failed to 
do. He was asking defendants, in effect, to purchase for cash 
from manufacturers the major items of furniture which were 
to constitute his stock in trade; to pay 90 per cent of the cost 
thereof while plaintiff advanced only 10 per cent of such cost; 
to keep an inventory of each item of furniture so stocked; 
to permit plaintiff to have possession of such furniture, to 
display it on his salesroom floor and, ordinarily at least. not 
to expect to be repaid for his advances or his costs of doing 
business until and unless the furniture items were sold to 
retail purchasers; "we were to pay him [defendants] one per 
cent a month for that privilege of having that, or whatever 
you want to call it, that flooring." 
"The form of the "trust receipts" is hereinafter quoted in footnote 4. 
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As indicated above it was agreed that defendant finance 
company would advance 90 per cent of the wholesale price 
of furniture selected by plaintiff for purchase, in a total 
amount not to exceed $5,000 (later increased to $7,500), that 
plaintiff would pay the remaining 10 per cent of the purchase 
price, and that title would be vested in defendants but posses-
sion for purposes of display on the salesroom floor would be 
in plaintiff. Pursuant to this arrangement plaintiff obtained 
from defendant finance company a series of loans. On the 
occasion of each loan plaintiff executed to the finance com-
pany a document entitled ''trust receipt.' '4 These documents 
evidence a security interest of the finance company in furni-
ture which is described therein and which plaintiff, by virtue 
of the arrangement, put in his store, exhibited, and sold or 
attempted to sell to retail customers. The finance company 
made a monthly charge of one per cent of the face amount of 
each ''trust receipt.'' .Also, during the period of the dealings 
between the parties, plaintiff, pursuant to the previously men-
tioned oral arrangement with Forrest, sold conditional sales 
contracts between plaintiff and his retail customers to the 
finance company, at discounts which amounted to about 17 
per cent of the face value of the contracts; the sales of these 
contracts were without recourse by the finance company 
against plaintiff. 
'Such documents read in material part as follows: "TRUST RECEIPT 
... [Plaintiff] as Trustee holds in trust for SECURITY AccEPTANCE Co., 
Entruster, as security for payment of the amount hereinafter set forth 
on the due date hereinafter specified, and all other obligations of Trustee 
to Entruster whether heretofore or hereafter incurred, the following 
personal property: [description 1 . . . in which personal property a 
security interest remains in or is hereby transferred to Entruster as 
security for such payment. Trustee agrees to hold said personal property 
in trust as the property of Entruster for the purpose of sale or exchange 
and to deliver same to the Entruster upon demand. Entruster may at 
any time ... either before or after the due date repossess said personal 
property without notice or demand of any kind and for such purpose 
Entruster or his representatives may without legal process enter any 
premises in which said personal property is located. . . . 
'' ... The Trustee may ... sell said personal property for cash or 
on terms approved in advance by Entruster for not less than the amount 
due En truster hereunder ... ; provided, however, that upon such sale 
all moneys hereby secured shall become immediately due and payable 
and all of the proceeds and considerations received in such sale shall 
be forthwith delivered to Entruster as security for payment of said 
moneys and until so delivered shall be held by the Trustee separate 
from the funds of the Trustee and as security for such payment. 
"In event of the repossession of the said personal property the En-
truster may on or after default give notice to the Trustee of intention to 
sell and may at any time not less than five (5) days after the giving 
of such notice sell said personal property at public or private sale, with 
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Plaintiff has discussed at great length the elements of a 
trust receipt relationship before and after enactment of the 
California version of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law ( Civ. 
Code, §§ 3012-3016.16) and has argued at great length that 
the elements of the relationship described in that law were not 
present in the various ''trust receipt'' transactions here. 5 
Plaintiff's arguments in this regard concern aspects of the 
trust receipt transactions which would be relevant only if 
rights of third parties (e.g., persons with prior liens on the 
furniture) were involved. Since it is undisputed that the 
transactions resulted in some ~ort of security interest in the 
finance company and since the· name of the type of interest is 
immaterial, it is unnecessary to describe in detail the manner 
in which these various transactions were handled or to con-
strue with particularity the Uniform Trust Receipts Law in 
its exact application to each transaction. F'or convenience of 
discussion the documents entitled "trust receipts" will be so 
referred to, but from this reference no implication that we are 
passing upon the law of trust receipts in relation to possible 
intervening rights of third persons is to be drawn. Our con-
cern here is not whether the requirements of the Uniform Trust 
Receipts Law were met in all respects, but whether the jury's 
or without notice and without any further notice or demand to the Trustee 
and without having said personal property at the place of sale, and may 
at any public sale itself become a purchaser. The proceeds of any such 
sale shall he applied, first, to payment of the expenses thereof; second, 
to payment of the expc11se of retaking, keeping and storing said per-
sonal property ... ; third, to the satisfaction of the Trustee's indebted-
ness hereby secured; and, fourth, to the payment of any other obligation 
owed by 'rrustee to Entruster. The Trustee shall receive any surplus 
and shall pay unto Entruster upon demand any deficiency. 
"Notice of intention to sell shall be deemed sufficiently given when 
in writing and either pm·sonally served on the Trustee or when deposited 
in the United States mail postage prepaid addressed to the Tmstee 's 
last known business address. 
''In the event of default by the Trustee in the payment of any 
moneys hereunder due on the due date hereof, Entruster may declare 
all moneys secured immediately due and payable. In event of such 
default Entruster may at his option and in lieu of sale as hereinabove 
provided declare a forfeiture of the Trustee's interest in said personal 
property against cancellation of the then remaining indebtedness in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 3016.2 of the Civil Code of the 
State of California. 
"No waiver of any existing default shall be deemed to waive any 
subsequent default and all rig·hts hereunder are cumulative and not 
alternative.'' 
5 From his opening statement on throughout the trial, except perhaps 
in connection with his motion for a directed verdict, plaintiff argued 
that the transactions evidenced by the trust receipt documents were 
''not trust receipts transactions'' but were ''mere loans.'' The error 
of this position, which was adopted by the trial court, is discussed later. 
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verdict that usury was not committed and that defendants 
did not convert plaintiff's property can properly be sustained. 
Plaintiff urges that as a matter of law the one per cent 
per month charges were interest at a rate in excess of that 
permitted by section 22 of article XX of the state Constitu-
tion.6 The controlling issue, however, as to this element of 
the case, is whether the monthly charges were exclusively 
for the forbearance of money or were for other services either 
wholly or at least in such part as to leave the amount paid as 
interest, if any, within a legal rate. This presents a question 
of fact and the evidence on it is conflicting but the issue does 
not appear to be a close one. Plaintiff's own testimony con-
flicts within itself; in significant parts, however, it corroborates 
the testimony of defendant Kenneth Forrest (the only defend-
ant who testified). 
[1] Plaintiff in his testimony variously described the 
charges as "for the privilege of having that ... flooring" 
and as ''interest.'' Forrest testified that in their preliminary 
negotiations "I mentioned the fact to Mr. Klett that I would 
charge him 1 per cent a month charges on flooring of mer-
chandise.'' Forrest further testified, '' Q. What was that 1 
per cent for, Mr. Forrest q A. The charge of enabling him 
to have our furniture in his store and other consideration. 
(~. \Vould that be for, let us say, ·wTiting up the trust receipt 
and handling the invoice and such as that~ A. Yes, sir, that 
would include writing up the trust receipt, the bookkeeper's 
time, making up a ledger card and putting it in the books 
and making up the addressograph plate to enable us to send 
the notice, and the notices themselves and the mail. ... 
Q. And for the use of that money you made a charge of 1 per 
cent, is that correct? A. For the privilege of his having my 
furniture in his store I charged him 1 per cent a month.'' 
Plaintiff himself testified, it will be remembered, that "we 
were to pay him [Forrest] one per cent a month for that 
privilege of having that . . . flooring.'' Further tending to 
support the implied finding of the jury that the one per cent 
charge vms intended by the parties not as interest but as 
compensation for the arrangement under which plaintiff, with-
out substantial capital or credit, was enabled to start and 
<"arry on a business and to that end was allowed to select for 
"Cal. Con st., art. XX, § 22: "The rate of interest upon the loan or 
forbearance of any money ... shall be seven per cent per annum 
hut it shall be competent :for the parties to any loan ... to contract 
in writing for a rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent per annum.'' 
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purchase, purchase, and display the furniture in his store, 
are plaintiff's references in his testimony to his ''ten per cent 
equity" in the furniture as to which the finance company was 
advancing 90 per cent of the wholesale price.7 
[2] Plaintiff further urges that as a matter of law the 
sales of his conditional sales contracts to the finance company 
at discounts of about 17 per cent were made under a scheme 
which secured to the finance company a collateral advantage 
and which was made for the sole purpose of evading the usury 
laws by giving the finance company a usurious profit on the 
loans. Such a scheme is usurious. (Terry Trading Corp. v. 
Barsky (1930), 210 Cal. 428, 432 [292 P. 474].) But there 
is ample evidence to support the implied finding of the jury 
that the discount sales of the conditional sales contracts were 
bona fide sales of property, were without recourse as against 
plaintiff or his partner, and were transactions made at plain-
tiff's request, and not part of a usurious scheme. (Of. Milana 
v. Credit Discounting Co. (1945), 27 Cal.2d 335, 340 [163 
P.2d 869, 165 A.L.R. 621].) 
[3] In connection with his argument that he was forced 
to sell his conditional sales contracts unprofitably plaintiff (cit-
ing 65 C.J., p. 101, § 177, and 22 C.J., p. 104, § 46) says that 
there is a presumption that the market value of those contracts 
was their face value. Since it is a matter of common knowledge 
that many retailers customarily discount such contracts and 
many finance companies purchase them, we cannot agree that 
there is any such presumption. 
Plaintiff asserts that even if the evidence does not show as 
a matter of law that the discounting of the contracts was a 
device to evade the usury laws, certain rulings of the trial 
court prevented him from properly presenting the question 
to the jury as one of fact. [4] He complains of the trial 
court's refusal to give the following formula instruction 
(requested by plaintiff): "if you find that the relationship 
existing between plaintiff and defendants herein was that of 
borrower and lender, insofar as the transactions occurring 
between the plaintiff and defendants evidenced by trust re-
ceipts are concerned, and you find that said transactions were 
•w e also note that plaintiff's original complaint does not seek re-
covery of usurious interest and penalties, but only seeks damages for 
conversion. This might be considered as tending to show that his 
claim that the charges were usurious interest was but an afterthought, 
prompted by litigation. 
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in fact loans of money,8 and you further find that as a con-
dition of making such loans the defendants required the 
plaintiff to sell to said defendants at less than their reason-
able, fair market value time contracts covering the sale of 
furniture by plaintiff to plaintiff's customers, then you must 
find that for the purposes of this action the amount under 
the reasonable, fair market value that each time contract was 
discounted is to be considered interest.'' The instruction 
was properly refused, for "the mere fact that ... [a bor-
rower] may have been required to enter into an unprofitable 
contract as a condition to a loan of money would not itself 
make the loan usurious." (Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky 
(1930), supm, 210 Cal. 428, 432.) Furthermore, as will 
8Here again, plaintiff suggests the erroneous view that trust receipt 
transactions and loans are mutually exclusive of each other. 
In his opening statement plaintiff's counsel said, ''Now, Mr. Klett 
... maintains throughout and has alleged in his complaint, that the 
transaction as carried on between himself and the defendant here was 
nothing more nor less than a loan of money. That is going to be 
one of the principal things that you folks are going to have to be looking 
for as the evidence develops ... Now ... the defendant ... will 
claim that the transaction ... between my client and themselves did not 
result in a loan of money, but that it was something else. 
" We will show that . . . Mr. Klett signed certain instruments . . • 
entitled 'Trust Receipts' and they were furnished by the defendant ... 
We will also show ... and prove, that these transactions were nothing 
more nor less than a loan of money, and that the defendant, for that 
loan of money, charged a mte of interest which we will prove to you is 
in excess of the amount that was permitted ... under the laws of this 
state ... Now, it is going to be up to you ... to determine what the 
transaction was.'' 
Again, in introducing in evidence the documents denominated ''trust 
receipts'' plaintiff's counsel insisted on the view that bona fide trust 
receipt transactions and loans of money were mutually exclusive of each 
other. The record shows: "MR. DuNNING [plaintiff's counsel] : I am 
introducing the instruments but, I want it understood that I am not 
introducing the instruments for the purpose of showing that they are 
trust receipts. THE CouR'l': You are introducing them but you claim they 
are not trust receipts? A. I claim they are not trust receipts, yes. THE 
CouRT: All right, you can put them in for that limited purpose. MR. 
DuNNING: In other words, I want it understood I am putting them 
in for the limited purpose and not for the purpose of establishing that 
they are trust receipts but for the purpose of showing the amount owing, 
if any, on December 27, 1946, from the plaintiff to the defendants and 
for the purpose of showing that the defendants had a security interest 
in the merchandise which is listed on these instruments entitled 'Trust 
Receipts.' MR. BEDEAU [defendants' counsel] : Aren't they going in 
for all pmposes regardless of whether you call them chattel mortgages 
or trust receipts? THE CouRT': No, he isn't introducing them-I don't 
understand myself about the security interest-but he wants to limit it 
for the two purposes and I guess that is all right.'' 
The above quoted statements of position by counsel for plaintiff are 
referred to infra, p. 782, in connection with an instruction given by the 
court which erroneously adopts the position taken by plaintiff. 
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appear more in detail from instructions hereinafter quoted, 
the jury were properly instructed that ''all the circumstances 
[and dealings of the parties] must be inquired into to deter-
mine whether ... there was a usurious charge of interest.'' 
[5] Plaintiff further complains that he was not allowed 
to prove the fair market value of the conditional sales con-
tracts because, when he asked Forrest, on cross-examination 
and with no offer of proof or statement of purpose, whether 
the 17 per cent discount was ''about the prevailing rate of 
discount,'' defendants' objection to the question ·was sus-
tained. If we assume that the question was designed to elicit 
evidence of the fair market value of conditional sales con-
tracts, and that it was proper on cross-examination of ·defend-
ant Forrest after plaintiff had rested his ease on direct exam-
ination, the sustaining of the objection thereto nevertheless 
could not have prejudiced plaintiff because, as previously 
stated, the jury impliedly found upon ample evidence and 
sufficient instructions that defendants did not require the sale 
of the contracts as a condition of making the loans. In this 
connection the jury were told, among other things, that 
"where different transactions have been entered into and these 
different transactions are relied upon in making a charge of 
usury all the circumstances must be inquired into to deter-
mine whether or not such collateral agreement or separate 
agreement was intended to be and was a part of another agree-
ment, and considering the two together there was a usurious 
charge of interest." (See also further instructions quoted 
infra, pp. 786-787.) 
As hereinabove mentioned, the court apparently accepted 
the view of the law suggested in plaintiff's opening statement 
and offer of proof as quoted in footnote 8, S1tpra, page 781, 
and gave instructions which erroneously assume that a "trust 
receipt" transaction and a usurious loan are mutually exclu-
sive concepts. 9 In fairness to plaintiff it is pointed out that 
9Such instructions read as follows: ''If the transactions between. the 
parties were trust receipt transactions and not loans, then the question 
of interest is not involved, and under such circumstances there can be 
no claim of usurious or unlawful interest.'' 
''In determining whether the transactions were loans or whether 
they were under trust receipts, you must determine what the transac-
tions were by a consideration of all the evidence, and not merely from 
what the parties or documents appear to be or the parties represent 
themselves to be. 
''It is necessary for you to determine whether the transactions were 
loans or were trust receipt transactions: 
''If you find as follows: The parties, prior to their later transactions, 
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while he made the opening statement, offer of proof, and 
request for instruction as shown in footnote 8 and its context, 
he did not request the instructions quoted in footnote 9 ; 
these latter instructions appear to have been formulated and 
given by the court of its own motion. [6] Trust receipts 
are "a method of securing a debt and not of creating a debt" 
(Commercial Discount Co. v. Los Angeles County (1940), 
16 Cal.2d 158, 161 [105 P.2d 115]) ; there can be no such thing 
as a security interest which secures no obligation. If Oil City 
Motor Co. v. C.I.T. Cm>p. (1935), 76 F.2d 589 [104 .A.L.R. 
240], purports to stand for the proposition that trust receipt 
transactions cannot be loans within the usury laws, then we 
cannot agree with it. As we understand the Oil City case, 
however, it is based upon the rule, not applicable here, that 
(p. 591 of 76 F.2d) "A return demanded and received for a 
understood a.nd agreed that the defendants were to finance the plaintiff 
in his husiness ... , that ... said agreement was to be carried out; 
that in carrying out the same the plaintiff made contact with several 
manufacturers in Los Angeles, who understood plaintiff was to be 
financed and that later the parties signed the agreements herein ad-
mitted in evidence and captioned 'trust receipts'; that in carrying out 
their understanding the plaintiff did in all cases but three or four, (in 
which three or four cases the money was sent by plaintiff [should read 
'' defendm1ts' 'l to tlHJ manufacturers) proceed to Los Angeles with his 
truck, or some truck under his control; that he did then order and secure 
delivery of various articles, from said manufacturers load the same on 
the trucks; and at the same time secure the invoices to the goods; that 
the trucks did deliver to his store at Sacramento; that he did at once 
take the invoices over to the defendants, and did present the same to 
defend;mts, and that the parties did then nnd there sign a document 
such as ndmitted in evidenee and designated trust receipt; that in that 
document there was a description and price of articles listed therein; 
tl1nt defendants did immediately give to the plaintiff a check to cover 
the ;mwunt thereof; that it was understood nnd agreed hy the parties 
that they wore, and it was the intent of each, that a trust receipt transac· 
tion was contemplated; and if you further find that the goods were 
placed in plaintiff's store, and that both parties so actecl that thereby 
tho goorls were 'floored,' and that both recognized that plaintiff was 
irnstee ns elsewhere described herein and did not have title thereto to 
rlispose of the same, except under tb e terms of the trust receipt and 
that defendants as entrusters had a secm-ity interest, and each party 
understood and agreed that the interest of the plaintiff was that of a 
trustee, as referred to elsewhere herein, and in the trust agreement; 
that when plaintiff delivered the invoices to defendants and received 
a check in payment thereof both he, as trustee and defendants as entrust-
ers intended t!Jat a security interest should thereby pass to entrusters 
ancl the check so given or money represented thereby was to be applied 
in payment to tile manufacturers as per said bill of goods, and both 
parties tlJCn rrnd tl1ere signed tbe various documents labeled trust re-
ceipts; that there waB no understanding or agreement express or im-
plied, other tlwn the above, if yon so find the facts to be, then I instruct 
you that it would be your duty to :find that the transactions as between 
the parties were trust receipt transactions and not loans.'' 
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bona fide loan or extension of credit as distinguished from a 
loan of money does not taint the transaction with usury 
regardless of the amount . . . if the transaction is in good 
faith and not a mere . . . device to conceal usury." 
We pass over the question as to whether plaintiff should 
be foreclosed, because, it may be argued, he induced the 
erroneous view, from raising the contention that the giving 
of the instructions quoted in footnote 9 was error, and we 
consider the contention on its merits. [7, 8] We recognize 
that such instructions are clearly erroneous to the extent 
that they imply that trust receipt transactions and loans are, 
respectively, inherently and necessarily exclusive each of the 
other, and to the extent that they advised the jury that "I£ 
the transactions . . . were trust receipt transactions and not 
loans, then the question of interest is not involved"; never-
theless, if all the instructions are read together, in the light 
of the evidence, it appears that the error could not reasonably, 
and plaintiff upon whom as appellant the burden rests has 
not shown that it did, result in a miscarriage of justice. It is 
obvious that in fact and in law loans were made, else there 
would have been no obligations for the trust receipts to secure, 
and it is equally obvious that documents in the form of trust 
receipts were used to evidence a security interest which, if 
the transactions were bona fide, was created. 
The error in the instructions quoted at length in foot-
note 9 lies in the statement that "If the transactions ... 
were trust receipt transactions and not loans, then the ques-
tion of interest is not involved, and under such circumstances 
there can be no claim of usurious or unlawful interest'' ; in 
the statement that "In determining whether the transactions 
were loans or whether they were under trust receipts, you 
must,'' etc. ; and in the statement that ''It is necessary for 
you to determine whether the transactions were loans or were 
trust receipt transactions.'' But in the lengthy substance of 
the instructions in question, after the opening paragraphs, 
the court implicitly predicates applicability of such instruc-
tions upon the condition ''If you find as follows : '' and then 
details facts which must be found if the subject instructions 
are to be given effect. Such facts all go to the question of 
good faith and substantiality in the use of the trust receipts, 
not to conceal a device for securing usurious interest, bnt to 
evidence a security interest in, and exclusively in, a bona fide 
flooring transaction in which legitimate charges other than 
for interest could be made. To this effect such instructions 
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particularly specified as conditions (which must have been 
found to exist before the instructions would have been appli-
cable) that it was agreed "that the defendants were to finance 
the plaintiff in his business" (not merely to loan money for 
interest to a going concern with established business and 
credit); that the furniture was actually bought from "several 
manufacturers in Los Angeles, who understood plaintiff was 
to be financed"; that the furniture so purchased was placed 
in plaintiff's store; that plaintiff "did at once take the in-
voices over to the defendants ... and that the parties did 
then and there sign a document . . . designated trust re-
ceipt; ... that defendants did immediately give to the plain-
tiff a check to cover the amount thereof; that it was under-
stood and agreed by the parties that they were, and it was 
the intent of each, that a trust receipt transaction was con-
templated; and if you further find that the goods were placed 
in plaintiff's store, and that both parties so acted that thereby · 
the goods were 'floored,' and that both recognized that plain-
tiff was trustee . . . and did not have title thereto to dispose 
of the same, except under the terms of the trust receipt and 
that defendants as entrusters had a security interest, and 
each party understood and agreed that the interest of the 
plaintiff was that of a trustee, as referred to ... in the trust 
agreement; ... that there was no understanding or agree-
ment express or irnplied, other than the above, if you so find 
the facts to be, then I instruct you that it would be your duty 
to find that the transactions as between the parties were trust 
receipt transactions and not loans." (Italics added.) Obvi-
ously it was error to give an instruction, standing alone, that 
if the transactions were trust receipt transactions they were 
not loans, but it is also obvious that applicability of that 
instruction was conditioned on the jury's finding that the 
trust receipt transactions were bona fide and to secure floor-
ing of the furniture and not to conceal or secure any hidden 
agreement for the mere payment of interest. 
Furthermore, the erroneous statements are to be con-
sidered in the light of other instructions given, hereinafter 
quoted. The jury were told that they must consider the in-
structions as a whole. So considered, the instructions make 
it clear that the ultimate issue actually to be decided was not 
whether the transactions were trust receipts or loans; that 
it was whether the loans, or the transactions by whatever 
name they might be called, were or were not usurious. The 
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jury were told what a loan is10 and under the undisputed evi-
dence, as already indicated, it would seem that they must 
have found that there were loans here. Trust receipts were 
partially explained to them, by quotations from the Uniform 
'l'rust Receipts Law, in such a manner that, in the light of 
the evidence, it would seem that they must have found, as 
likewise already indicated, that there were trust receipts here. 
Moreover, the jury were told to look to all the circumstances 
in determining whether there was a usurious charge of in-
terest. 
Following are the instructions to this effect which were 
given at plaintiff's request : ''A contract or agreement in-
volving a loan of money may be verbal or in writing, and 
the promise or obligation to repay or return the money may be 
secured or unsecured. The form of instrument by which a 
borrower hypothecates or puts up property to secure the re-
payment of the money borrowed does not in and of itself 
change what is in fact a loan of money into something else. 
Such instrument may be in form a mortgage contract, a pledge 
contract, a trust receipt contract r italics added] or any one 
of a number of other writings made to secure the obligation, 
and you are instructed that if from all the circumstances 
surrounding the transactions occurring between plaintiff and 
defendants you find that the transactions were in fact loans 
of money, then any such instrument or instruments purport-
ing to transfer an interest in property solely for the purpose 
of securing repayment of the money borrowed does not change 
what in fact was a loan of money into some other form of obli-
gation. In other words, once a loan of money is made, any 
instrument executed or given to secure repayment of that 
loan of money does not change or destroy the fact that a 
loan of money was made in the original instance.'' 
''The intent with which the usurv is committed is imma-
terial, for the voluntary taking of m~re than the legal rate of 
interest constitutes nsury. Therefore the only intent neces-
sary on the part of the lender is the intent to take more 
interest than the law permits. Usurious intent is implied if 
excessive interest is intentionally taken, and it is of no con-
sequence that there was no specific intent knowingly to vio-
late the usury law. 
10The following instruction was given: ''A loan of money is the de-
livery of a sum of money to another under a contract to return at some 
future time an equivalent amount with or without nn additional sum 
ngreed upon for its use.'' This definition is materially similar to the 
definition in the Civil Code ( § 1912). 
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''However where clifferent transactions have been entered 
into and these different transactions are relied upon in mak-
ing a charge of usury all the circumstances must be inquired 
into to determine whether or not such collateral agreement, 
or separate agreement 1vas intended to be and was a part 
of another agreement, and considering the two together there 
was a usurious charge of interest. . . . Under such circum-
stances the question is IYhether there was an intent to evade 
the law with regard to usury, and all the circumstances may 
be considered in the determination of such question. The 
burden rests upon the one charging usury to establish such 
charge.'' 
In the light of these instructions it would be attributing 
to the jury folly; or disregard of the charge to consider the 
instructions as a whole, to assume that they thought that the 
lengthy trial was had in order to determine whether the re-
lationship of plaintiff and the finance company was that of 
borrower and lender or that of trustee and entruster (when 
it 'Was undisputably both), rather than to determine whether 
the lomB :oenued by the trust rcPeipts were usurious. It 
is dear-or at the very least plaintiff has failed to sustain 
the burden of showing convincing evidence to the contrary-
that the jury rejected plaintiff's contention that the finance 
\"ompany charged usurious interest because it is apparent from 
plaintiff's testimony as a whole that he first conceived the 
notion that the transactions vvere illeg'al when he decided 
upon this action as a method of recouping his failing for-
tunes11 after he defaulted on a payment due to the finance 
company. 
[9] Plaintiff also complains of the giving of the follow-
ing instruction : ''A lender is not prohibited from charging· 
an extra and reasonable amount for incidental services, ex-
penses or risk additional to the lawful interest, other than 
for the loan of money. He may make a reasonable charge for 
investigating, arranging, negotiating, brokering, making, ser-
vicing, collecting and enforcing his obligation. 
''Such items, however, must be confined to specific service 
or expense incidental to the loan incurred in such a way as 
11 A statement covering plaintiff's business during the period from 
July 7, 1946, to December 27, 1946 (on the latter date, as hereinafter 
described. defendants took possession of the furniture because of plain-
tiff's default in payments), shows "liabilities owing" in the amount of 
$21,829.67; under assets, ''cash on hand in bank was a minus $39.85,'' 
and "Mr. Klett's capital was a deficit, $2,712.26." 
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to preclude it being a device through which additional interest 
or profit on the loan may be exacted.'' 
This instruction, given at defendants' request, is a correct 
statement of the law (In re F~~ller ( 1940), 15 Cal.2d 425, 433, 
434 [102 P.2d 321]; see Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co. 
(1927), 200 Cal. 609, 616 [254 P. 956, 255 P. 805, 53 A.L.R. 
725], pointing out that a general charge for "expenses" or 
''services'' not attributable to any particular expense or ser-
vice may well be but a device to evade the usury law). Plaintiff 
asserts that the instruction conflicts with the provision of 
section 22 of article XX of the California Constitution that 
"No person ... or corporation shall by charging any fee, 
bonus, commission, discount or other compensation receive 
from a borrower more than ten per cent per annum upon 
any loan or forbearance of any money ... '' [10] Legitimate 
charges for specific items of actual service and expense are 
not, as plaintiff seems to believe, compensation for the loan 
of money; i. e., such charges are not interest; and the state-
ment in Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1949), 33 Cal.2d 
564, 579 [203 P.2d 758], that the quoted constitutional provi-
sion was intended ''to prevent lenders from circumventing the 
limits on interest ... by forbidding any charges whereby 
the borrower is required to pay more than the 10 per cent,'' 
does not mean that charges which are not interest become 
interest by reason of the constitutional amendment. 
[11] There was received in evidence, over plaintiff's objec-
tion, the statement of trust receipt financing which, under sec-
tion 3016.9 of the Civil Code, may be filed by an entruster with 
the Secretary of State. The statement was merely some evi-
dence that the finance company intended to lend money to 
plaintiff on the security of trust receipts. Its admission could 
not have prejudiced plaintiff. He, himself, proved the fact. 
The Conversion Cause of Action 
On December 16, 1946, after defendants had been financing 
plaintiff under the '' tr~st receipt'' arrangement for about 
a year, plaintiff issued to defendants his check for the amount 
due under one of the ''trust receipts'' which covered furniture 
which had been sold by plaintiff to a retail customer. The 
check was not honored because there were insufficient funds 
in plaintiff's bank account. Also at this time plaintiff, in 
violation of the terms of ''trust receipts,'' had not turned over 
to defendants the proceeds of sales of certain other furniture 
which was covered by such "trust receipts." The due dates 
on the other ''trust receipts'' covering the furniture in plain-
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tiff's store had passed. After the check was dishonored defend-
ant Forrest made several oral demands that plaintiff make 
good the check, and that he pay the entire amount due to the 
finance company (about $7,030) or surrender possession of 
the entrusted furniture. Plaintiff stated that he had no money 
with which to pay the finance company. On December 27, 
1946, Forrest, as he had told plaintiff he would do, came 
to plaintiff's store and took all the furniture which was cov-
ered by ''trust receipts''; Forrest also took other furniture, 
not covered by ''trust receipts,'' of a value equal to that of 
the furniture which plaintiff had improperly sold without 
delivering the proceeds. 
The complaint on which the case was tried alleges that 
defendants on December 27, 1946, converted, took, and carried 
away the furniture; that plaintiff thereafter demanded and 
defendants refused return of such furniture; and, upon infor-
mation and belief, that defendants subsequently sold the 
furniture. 
The jury, adequately instructed, 12 impliedly found upon 
sufficient evidence13 that plaintiff consented to the taking of 
the furniture on December 27. [12] Since plaintiff con-
sented to the taking of the furniture, that taking was not a 
conversion, and the following contentions of plaintiff (together 
with related contentions concerning the instructions) are 
12The jury were told that ''in a legal sense the word 'consent' means 
capable, deliberate, free and voluntary assent or agreement to, or con-
currence in, some act or purpose, implying physical and mutual power and 
free action which is unclouded by threats, or duress. It presupposes 
that the person to be affected has knowledge of his rights. If, therefore, 
consent is given or obtained by means of unwarranted threats, or is 
given by a person without full knowledge of his rights, such a consent 
has no force or effect whatsoever, and the legal effect of consent given 
under such circumstances is the same as though no consent were given''; 
that "he who consents to an act is not wronged by it"; and that "If 
you believe that when the defendants called upon plaintiff to surrender 
the merchandise which was then in plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff 
did not dispute defendants' right to the goods, or set up a claim to 
them against the defendants, but freely consented thereto, then the 
defendants committed no conversion.'' 
13After Forrest had demanded that plaintiff pay the amount due the 
finance company or surrender the furniture, and plaintiff had told 
Forrest that he could not pay, Forrest told plaintiff that on the morning 
of the 27th he (Forrest) would come to plaintiff's store to take the 
furniture. On that morning plaintiff went to the store with Forrest. 
Plaintiff told an employe that Forrest "has come for the furniture and 
is going to take it out of the store and we are going to turn it over 
to him,'' and directed the employe to turn over to Forrest certain furni-
ture not covered by "trust receipts" in place of furniture which plain-
tiff had improperly sold without delivering the proceeds of the sales to 
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without merit: that Forrest improperly took some furniture 
which plaintiff had already sold to retail purchasers; that 
plaintiff was not in default (because of a waiver of default) 
and therefore defendants could not sell the furniture without 
notice to plaintiff; that because defendants were not licensed 
under the Personal Property Brokers Act (Stats. 1909, p. 969, 
as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5825 (2d) 14 ) the 
loans were void ( § 21) and therefore the sale of the furniture 
in which the finance company had only a purported security 
interest amounted to a conversion. 
[13] Furthermore, the Personal Property Brokers Act had 
no application. The act did not apply to "bona fide con-
ditional contracts of sale involving the disposition of personal 
property, when such forms of sales agreements are not used 
for the purpose of evading this act'' ( § 4, par. (c)), and ''As 
used in this act the term 'conditional contracts of sale' shall 
include flooring contracts" ( § 3). The security transactions 
here, although not conditional sales contracts in the usual sense 
of the term, are "flooring contracts" within the meaning of 
the act and within the definition of ''flooring contracts'' 
accepted by plaintiff; hence they are included within the defi-
nition ( § 3 of the act) of conditional contracts of sale. (See 
plaintiff's instruction quoted sttpm, footnote 1; Commercial 
Credit Co. v. Barney JYI. Co. (1938), 10 Cal.2d 718, 720 [76 
P.2d 1181] .) 
Plaintiff complains that an objection to the following 
question addressed to him was sustained: ''Now, assuming 
he [Forrest] did not have a right to remove that furniture, 
would you have consented to his taking any of the furniture~'' 
Framed as it was, the question required plaintiff to speculate 
on what his action would have been. If plaintiff wished to 
adduce testimony as to his state of mind he could have testified 
to it directly rather than speculatively. 
[14] Certain evidence offered by plaintiff to prove the 
extent of his damages was rejected. Since the jury found 
against plaintiff on the issue of liability and did not reach 
defendants. At the time Forrest was taking the furniture plaintiff asked 
Forrest to hold it for him because plaintiff believed he might he able 
to raise some money; l~orrest replied that he would hold it for five days; 
and plaintiff stated that that was satisfactory. Thereafter plaintiff did 
not communicate with defendants concerning the furniture. Defendants 
held it for more than five days and then, without notice to plaintiff, sold 
it for about $6,:)00 and applied this sum to the cancellation of plaintiff's 
deht; nl1ont $.130 remained owing fTom plaintiff to the finance company. 
14Provisions based upon this act arc now found in the Financial Code, 
~ 22000 et seq. 
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the issue of damages, plaintiff cannot now complain of the 
rejection of the evidence as to extent of damages. 
[15] Pinally, plaintiff asserts that the jury were out too 
short a time to have properly deliberated. '!.'hey retired at 
11 :10 a.m. and returned 25 minutes later with a signed 
separate verdict o·n each of the two counts. The jury were 
polled and, with the exception of one juror as to count 2, 
the verdicts for defendants were unanimous. vV e cannot 
conclude from this circumstance, either standing alone or in 
the light of the entire record, that there is reasonable ground 
for concluding that there has been a miscarriage of justice; 
accordingly the verdicts must be upheld. (Cal. Const., art. 
VI,§ 4%.) 
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., 'l.'raynor, J., and Spence, J., eon-
curred. 
Edmonds, J ., concurred in the judgment. 
CAHTEH, J.-I dissent. 
The main issue presented in this case was whether the 
transaction between plaintiff and defendants was usurious. 
The transaction was in the form of trust receipts and the 
court erroneously instructed the jury, as is conceded by the 
majority opinion, that a trust receipt transaction can never 
be usurious and if it was found to be such an arrangement in 
this case, defendants must recover. Yet it is held that there 
was no prejudice-that the jury was not misled. I think it 
is clear that the majority opinion itself demonstrates that 
the jury was misled. The parties and the trial court were 
confused as to the law on the subject and hence the erroneous 
instructions were given. How then may it be said the jury 
was not confused f 
'l'urning to the law involved, it appeared that the trust 
receipt instruments were between plaintiff-dealer, as trustee, 
and the company-financier, as entruster, and provided that the 
trustee "holds in trust" for the entruster, "as security for 
payment of the amount hereinafter set forth on the due date 
hereinafter specified,'' the described furniture, ''in which per-
sonal property a security interest remains in or is hereby 
transferred to Entruster as security for such payment. Trus-
tee agrees to hold said personal property in trust as the prop-
erty of Entruster for the purpose of sale or exchange and to 
deliver same to the Entruster upon demand. Entruster may 
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at any time examine said personal property and the books 
and records of the Trustee with reference thereto and may 
at any time either before or after the due date repossess said 
personal property without notice or demand of any kind 
and for such purpose Entruster or his representatives may 
without legal process enter any premises in which said personal 
property is located. Entruster may insure said personal 
property against the hazards of fire and theft while held by the 
Trustee for not less than the amount secured hereby, and the 
Trustee agrees to pay the premiums and charges for such in-
surance to Entruster upon demand and until so paid same 
shall likewise be secured hereby. 
''. . . The Trustee may, however, sell said personal prop-
erty for cash or on terms approved in advance by Entruster 
for not less than the amount due Entruster hereunder, includ-
ing insurance premiums and charges; provided, however, 
that upon such sale all moneys hereby secured shall become 
immediately due and payable and all of the proceeds and con-
siderations received in such sale shall be forthwith delivered 
to Entruster as security for payment of said moneys and 
until so delivered shall be held by the Trustee separate from 
the funds of the Trustee and as security for such payment." 
The articles of furniture are described and an amount named 
"Amt. Secured" is set opposite each, together with the clue 
elate. On repossession of the property by the entruster it 
may sell it and apply the proceeds to the expenses of the sale 
and "to the satisfaction of the Trustee's indebtedness hereby 
secured; and, fourth, to the payment of any other obligation 
owed by Trustee to Entruster. The Trustee shall receive 
any surplus and shall pay into Entruster upon demand any 
deficiency. . . . 
''In the event of default by the Trustee in the payment 
of any moneys hereunder due on the due elate hereof, En-
truster may declare all moneys secured immediately clue and 
payable. In event of such default Entruster may at his 
option and in lieu of sale as hereinabove provided declare a 
forfeiture of the Trustee's interest in said personal property 
against cancellation of the then remaining indebtedness in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 3016.2 of the Civil 
Code of the State of California.'' 
It is quite clear that the transactions were standard trust 
receipt arrangements as they are established by the Uniform 
Trust Receipts Law. (Civ. Code, §§ 3012-3016.16.) That 
law defines an entruster as one who has directly or by agent 
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taken a ''security interest'' in goods under a trust receipt 
transaction, but does not include a person who owns goods 
and sells them on conditional sale for profit. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 3013 [3] .) A "security interest" is a property interest in 
goods limited "to securing performance of some obligation 
of the trustee." (Id., §3013[12].) A "trustee" is a person 
"having or taking" possession of goods under a trust receipt 
transaction. (Id., § 3013[14].) "New value," includes new 
''advances or loans'' made, but not extensions or renewals 
of existing obligations of the trustee. (I d., § 3013 [7].) A 
trust receipt transaction is any transaction where the entruster 
and trustee are parties for one of the purposes mentioned 
in the section (that is, applicable here, where the possession 
of the goods by the trustee is for the purpose of selling them 
[Id., §3014(1)(3)(a)]), whereby "(a) The entruster or 
any third person delivers to the trustee goods ... in which the 
entruster (i) prior to the transaction has, or for new value 
( ii) by the transaction acquires or (iii) as the result thereof 
is to acquire promptly, a security interest ... provided, that 
the delivery under paragraph (a) ... either (i) Be against 
the signing and delivery by the trustee of a writing designating 
the goods . . . concerned, and reciting that a security interest 
therein remains in or will remain in, or has passed to or will 
pass to, the entruster .... " (Id., § 3014[1] [a] [b] [i].) The 
security interest of the entruster may be derived from the 
trustee or from any other person. (Id., § 3014[1].) Under 
the initial oral agreement here, the method by which the 
transactions were handled, we have at least a situation where 
the purpose of the arrangement was to enable plaintiff-trustee 
to have possession of the goods for retail sale ; defendant com-
pany-entruster acquired its security interest from the plaintiff-
trustee; the goods were delivered to the trustee by a third 
person, the factory-seller and the entruster "by the transac-
tion is to acquire promptly'' a security interest. The trust 
receipts declaring the security interest in the entruster were 
executed immediately after the trustee obtained possession 
of the goods from the seller in conformity with the prior oral 
understanding. The entruster gave new value, that is, the 
payment of 90 per cent of the cost of the goods. We do not 
read the uniform law as requiring that title pass to the 
entruster from the seller-factory, that is, that a tripartite 
arrangement is required between the seller, retail dealer and 
financier. As long as it is a part of the same transaction, 
and the steps are in close proximity, we have a trust receipt. 
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Here the advancements were made to enable the dealer-trustee 
to buy from the seller and the advances were to be secured 
by trust receipts. All according to an oral understanding, 
and promptly upon delivery of the goods by the seller to the 
trustee, the advancements were made, the seller was paid, and 
a trust receipt executed which vested a security interest in the 
entruster. It is true that a trust receipt under the uniform 
law is not a negotiable promissory note, for it is not an 
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain. It is a method 
of ''securing a debt and not creating a debt.'' Nor is it a 
chattel mortgage or conditional sale. ( Cornrner·cial Discmlnt 
Co. v. Los Angeles Cmtnty, 16 Cal.2d 158 [105 P.2d 115] ; 
Chichester· v. Commercial Credit Co., 87 Cal.App.2d 489 [99 
P .2d 1088] . ) Nevertheless, the transaction is a security 
transaction. As said in Cornnwr·cial Discount Co. v. Los Angeles 
County, supra, 16 Cal.2d 158, 161, after stating that a trust 
receipt is a method of securing a ''debt'' not creating a 
"debt": "There is nothing in the law which would prevent 
the execution of a promissory note or notes representing the 
amounts secured by the trust receipts. It does not appear that 
the plaintiff took notes from the automobile dealers for that 
purpose and the case is presented on the theory that the 
obligations to repay the money loaned rested in parol.'' In 
Chichester v. Cornmm·cr·az Credit Co., supra, 87 Cal.App.2d 
439, the order for cars ~was placed by the retail dealer with 
the factory-seller and the financier paid the seller for them 
and they were shipped, the bills of lading going to the 
financier who turned them over to the dealer on his signing 
a trust receipt and he then got possession of them. \Vhile 
that was a tripartite transaction, the court said (p. 448) : 
''Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law, 
the only instance where the security title of a trust receipt 
holder was permitted to prevail against the claims of credi-
tors of the trustee or against his trustee in bankruptcy, was 
where the title of the entruster or trust receipt holder was 
derived from someone other than the trustee. (Ar·ena v. Bank 
of Italy, 194 Cal. 195 [228 P. 441]; In re James, Inc., supra 
[30 F.2d 555]; In re Fonntain, 282 F. 816 [25 A.L.R. 319] .) 
\Vhere the title of the entruster was derived from the trustee 
and not from some third person, the transaction was treated as 
being similar to a chattel mortgage and was held to be void 
as against creditors of the trustee in the absence of recorda-
tion . (Arena v. Bank of Italy, supra.) 
''If in the instant case defendant held the title to the 
automobiles at all times, as was found by the court, deriving 
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such title directly from the Chrysler Corporation, its security 
interest would be protected under the former law as well as 
under section 3016.4 of the Civil Code. The evidence discloses 
with respect to the Chrysler automobiles that although they 
were shipped by the Chrysler Corporation directly to Reagan, 
accompanied by invoices made out to Reagan, the bills of 
lading were made out to, and were sent directly to defendant. 
The evidence is conflicting as to whether sight drafts were 
attached to all of such bills of lading, but it appears without 
controversy that in every instance, whether by paying such 
drafts, or by other arrangements, defendant paid the full 
purchase price for such automobiles directly to the Chrysler 
Corporation. Moreover, defendant paid all of the freight 
charges. 'rhe bills of lading were not delivered to Reagan 
until after the trust receipts had been signed. Concerning 
the Plymouth automobiles which were delivered from the Los 
Angeles office of the Chrysler Corporation, defendant after 
securing trust receipts from Reagan, ordered the cars to be 
delivered to Reagan's place of business and paid the purchase 
price directly to the corporation. There is no evidence what-
ever tending to prove that Reagan at any time prior to signing 
the trust receipts, had either title to or possession of any of 
the automobiles in question. Although the trial court found 
that defendant was at all times the owner of the automobiles 
in question, it was of no consequence whether defendant's title 
originated with the Chr·ysler Cor·poration or wr:th Reagan. 
"Plaintiff places great reliance upon the case of Arena v. 
Bank of Italy, snpra, in support of his contention that a trust 
receipt which does not comply with the provisions of section 
3440 of the Civil Code is void as against creditors of the 
trustee. That decision, however, is clearly distinguishable 
upon its facts from the instant case. It must be borne in 
mind that the Arena case was decided long prior to the enact-
ment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law. In the Arena case, 
one Dellaira having both the title and possession of certain 
g·oods, assigned and delivered possession of such goods to the 
Bank of Italy as security for an indebtedness ; thereafter the 
bank restored the possession of such goods to Dellaira and, 
at the same time took the trust receipts in question from 
Dellaira. Obviously, whatever title or interest the bank ac-
quired could only have been derived from Dellaira, the 
trustee under the trust receipts. The court properly held 
that under the law which existed at that time, i.e., prior to 
the enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Law, the trans-
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action was to be treated as being in the nature of a chattel 
mortgage and consequently void as against the trustee's 
(debtor's) creditors unless properly recorded. 
''From the foregoing discussion it appears that under the 
former law the source of the en truster's title was the con-
trolling factor in determining whether or not a given trust 
receipt transaction was valid. However, under the existing 
law, by which the instant case is to be governed, the en-
truster's security interest will be protected whether his title 
is derived from the trustee or from a third party. From an 
examination of section 3014 of the Civil Code, which defines 
trust receipt transactions, it is apparent that the legislature 
intended to include within the general provisions of the law 
all trust receipt transactions without regard to the source of 
the entruster's title. That section provides, among other 
things: 'The security interest of the entruster may be derived 
from the tntstee or from any other person, and by pledge or 
by transfer of title or otherwise.' 
''The only case which has come to our attention, involving 
an interpretation of the California Uniform Trust Receipts 
Law, is In re Boswell, 20 F.Supp. 748, affirmed in 96 F.2d 
239. The facts of that case were similar to those of the Arena 
case in that the entruster derived its title from the trustee who 
had both possession and title to the merchandise covered by 
the trust receipt. Thereafter the trustee became bankrupt 
and action was brought by the entruster to reclaim the mer-
chandise from the trustee in bankruptcy. It was held that 
under the sections of the Civil Code comprising the Uniform 
Trust Receipts Law, such a transaction was valid and enforce-
able and that the entruster was entitled to reclaim the mer-
chandise in question from the trustee in bankruptcy." In re 
Boswell, 20 F.Supp. 748, affirmed 96 F.2d 239, approved in the 
Chichester case, involved a situation where the retail dealer 
bought the merchandise on open account from the seller-
factory and title passed to him and the bank-financier ad-
vanced $800 to pay for it and took notes representing the 
amount and a trust receipt as security. In In re Chappell, 
77 F'.Supp. 573, 575, it is said: "In order to constitute a 
trust receipt transaction under the Oregon Uniform Trust 
Receipts Law the entruster bank must acquire its security 
interest prior to or at the same time as delivery is made to 
the dealer, or delivery must be made under some arrangement 
whereby the security interest is to be acquired 'promptly.' 
Section 75-102, O.C.L.A. In other words, the delivery of the 
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goods to the dealer must stem from an arrangement between 
the bank and the dealer for the acquisition of the goods by 
means of advances from the bank." (See, also, Automobile 
Banking Corp. v. Weicht, 160 Pa. Super. 422 [51 A.2d 409] ; 
Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal.App.2d 729 
[137 P.2d 729]; Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank 
of Petersburg, 224 Ind. 1 [64 N.E.2d 28, 168 A.L.R. 352] ; 
57 Yale L.J., 761; 5 Fordham L.Rev., 17, 240; 16 Wash. 
L.Rev. 1, 10; 41 Colo.L.Rev., 1134; 3 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev., 
26.) Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Chichester case on the 
ground that there was at the time that case arose a subdivision 
(c) to subdivision ( 1) of section 3014, which read : ". . . or 
(c) the en truster gives new value in reliance upon the transfer 
by the trustee to such entruster of a security interest in goods 
or documents in possession of the trustee and the possession 
of which is retained by the trustee . . . '' which subdivision 
was later eliminated by amendment ( Stats. 1939, p. 2826), 
and a special provision was added for the protection of motor 
vehicle and a,ircraft dealers, reading: ''A trust receipt trans-
action is also one in which, pursuant to a trust receipt, a motor 
vehicle dealer or aircraft dealer as trustee obtains new value 
from an entruster upon the transfer to the latter of a security 
interest in new or used motor vehicles or aircraft, whether or 
not such vehicles or aircraft are owned or possessed by the 
trustee prior or subsequent to the execution of the trust re-
ceipt document, and whether or not such vehicles or aircraft 
are thereafter retained in the trustee's possession. 
"All of the provisions of this chapter which are applicable 
to the trust receipt transactions enumerated in Section 3014 
are applicable to the trust receipt transaction specified in 
this section." ( Civ. Code, § 3014.5.) But the Chichester 
case was not based on said subdivision (c) as seen from the 
quotation therefrom, supra. The transaction here concerned, 
falls within subdivision (a) of subdivision (1) and the next 
to last paragraph in subdivision ( 1). The special provision 
for motor vehicles and aircraft deals with cases where the 
dealer has possession of the goods prior to and wholly inde-
pendent of the trust receipt. There is no relation between 
his possession and the trust receipt. Here the whole thing was 
a part of a continuous transaction. 
As plaintiff's first cause of action is for allegedly usnrious 
interest, defendants urge that there could be no such interest 
for the reason that "trust receipts" are not subject to the 
usury law (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; Stats. 1919, p. lxxxiii), 
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as they are not a loan or forbearance of money. We find 
nothing in the trust receipts law that exempts such transac-
tions from the usury law. As above seen they are a sui generis 
type of secu1·ity transaction, somewhat like a chattel mort-
gage, pledge or conditional sales contract, but different from 
any of them. The fact remq,ins that the transaction is a 
method by which the performance of some financial obliga-
tion is secnred, the same as is true of other security arrange-
ments such as chattel mortgages. Being only the security 
instrument, like a chattel mortgage, accurately speaking, it is 
not the loam:ng instrument-or one containing the promise 
to pay or do some other act. Such features are usually found 
in promissory notes or collateral promises to perform. In 
trust receipts the main purpose is to assure the entruster that 
he will be repaid the money advancements he has made to 
enable the trustee-dealer to obtain possession of and sell 
merchandise. He may be in the position of a lender to the 
dealer-borrower. The obligation or promise for which the 
trust receipt is given, must be examined to determine whether 
there has been a loan or forbearance and whether the interest 
is too high. In Oil City Motor Co. v. C. I. T. Corp., 76 F.2d 
589 [104 A.L.R. 240], the finance company paid the price 
of the cars to the seller and they were then shipped to the 
dealer and the latter gave a trust receipt to the company, 
thus enabling the dealer to obtain the cars with the instru-
ments of title. If that case purports to stand for the proposi-
tion that such transactions may never be loans within the 
usury laws, we cannot agree with it. It is based upon the 
proposition that a sale or loan of credit is not a loan of money 
and therefore not within the usury law, a principle which is 
subject to the qualification that such a device may not be used 
as a cloak for usury. It has been said: "It is well settled that 
the usury law is inapplicable to a transaction amounting 
merely to a loan or sale of credit, and a loan of money, to 
facilitate which a loan of credit is made, is not rendered 
usurious by the payment of, or agreement to pay, a sum 
exacted for the loan of the credit. However, it is difficult 
to lay down any general rule as to what amounts to a sale 
of credit as difltinguishec1 from a loan. Although the trans-
action must not be a mere cover for usury, and in the decision 
of this question the intellt of the parties is important, gener-
ally speaking, consideration must be given to the particular 
facts in order to determine whether one of the parties to the 
transaction is to advance money, or whether the advance is 
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to be made in the first instance by a third party. If, for in-
stance, the transaction is one not contemplating· the immediate 
advance of money by a party thereto, but merely a means of 
enabling one of the parties to procure funds from a third 
party, it is properly deemed a sale of credit, as regards the 
usury statutes, although eventually the party permitting the 
use of his credit has to advance the money before he is placed 
in funds or property by the one receiving the credit." (55 
Am.Jur., Usury, § 25.) The most common and clear instance 
of its application is where a person guarantees payment by 
the maker of a promissory note. (See 104 A.L.R. 245.) 
Where, however, as a part of the transaction, the lender in 
fact advances the money to purchase the merchandise for 
the dealer, with an express or implied promise to repay the 
mon~y, together with what qualifies as interest under the 
usury law, there may be a loan of money. (See Osborne v. 
Fuller, 92 S.C. 338 [75 S.E. 557, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 1058]; Wood 
v. Angeles JJlesa Land Co., 120 Oal.App. 313 [7 P.2d 748] .) 
An issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the basic 
transaction constituted a loan or forbearance within the mean-
ing of the usury law. 
'rhe majority opinion says that the case is not a close one; 
that the instructions permitted the jury to find the transac-
tions were trust reeeipts and yet loans, for it eould find that 
the trust receipts were bona fide and to seeure floort"ng of the 
furniture and not an agreement for interest, that is, in effect, 
that if they were flooring contracts, there was no usury. Not 
only is that not true but the majority concedes it is not, later 
in the opinion, where it is said : ''The security transactions 
here, although not conditional sales contracts in the usual 
s<:>nse of the term, are 'flooring contracts' within the meaning 
of the aet and within the definition of 'flooring contracts' 
aecepted by plaintiff." But, obviously, flooring eontracts are 
the same as trust receipts. The ultimate holding is therefore 
that flooring eontracts-trust receipts-are not subject to 
the usury laws. 
As I have pointed out, the case was a close one. Indeed 
the evidence is overwhelming that the transactions were loans 
for which interest was charged which exceeded the legal limit. 
There is evidence from which it may be inferred that the 
transaction was a loan of money rather than a loan or sale 
of credit, or any other transaction, such as the actual ad-
vance of the money to either plaintiff or the manufacturer, 
carrying with it an implied promise to repay together with 
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1 per cent per month. The trust receipt refers to an "in-
debtedness" for which it stands as security; that a "security 
interest'' is transferred to the en truster-defendant, thus nega-
ting a sale of the property. In some of defendants' accounts 
the 1 per cent item has the letters "Int." after them, indi-
cating interest. Defendants are in the lending and financing 
business, not the retail furniture business. Defendants' ex-
planation of the arrangement with plaintiff is weak and con-
clusionary, barely sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence. 
Kenneth Forrest, one of the officials, testified that it was for 
trust receipts and plaintiff Klett ''asked me or rather told 
me he had been in the furniture business for approximately 
thirty years ; that he understood it very thoroughly; he was 
forming a partnership with a Mr. Raymond Parker and Mr. 
Parker was going to put up $7500.00 and he was going to put 
up his ability and they were going to start a furniture store 
on the Davis Highway and Mr. Parker at that time had not 
put up all his money and he had only put up, if I remember 
correctly, around $2000.00 or $2500.00 and that he would like 
to find some way to have furniture placed in his store and asked 
me if I would be able to do his financing for him and I told him 
it was impossible for me to finance any furniture because it 
did not have a serial number on it, that if he would like to 
floor his merchandise such as appliances that I would be glad 
to do it for him and he told me that I had known him for 
considerable time and he would be glad to place a serial number 
on each individual piece of furniture and under those circum-
stances would I floor merchandise for him and I told him, 
after some conversation back and forth regarding his ex-
perience, I told him I would do it and I told him when I would 
be able to do it under trust receipts, that I would send the 
checks direct to the factory on each particular deal and that 
he would put up 10 per cent and I would charge him 1 per 
cent a month and at that time he stated he had some furniture 
in Sacramento already, I asked him, is it paid for and he said 
it was and I told him that we would purchase the furniture in 
Sacramento on trust receipts and pay him 90 per cent of that 
and charge him 1 per cent of that also . . . and, about that 
time, he asked me if I would also handle his contracts and I 
told him that I would be glad to purchase his contracts but 
that I would have to buy them non-recourse as we didn't have 
a loan license and it would be necessary that we buy the con-
tracts non-recourse and that our charge for purchasing them 
was approximately 17 per cent and he said that was perfectly 
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satisfactory, that he would be glad to do business with us on 
that basis ... Mr. Klett asked me if I would be able to 
finance about $5,000 and I told him that we would, in fact, 
we stipulated at that time we wouldn't go over $5,000." In 
regard to the 1 per cent per month charge, Forrest testified: 
'' Q. What was that 1 per cent for, Mr. Forrest f A. The 
charge of enabling him to have our furniture in his store and 
other consideration. Q. ·would that be for, let us say, writing 
up the trust receipt and handling the invoice and s.uch as 
that? A. Yes, sir, that would include writing up the trust 
receipt, the bookkeeper's time, making up a ledger card and 
putting it in the books and making up the addressograph 
plate to enable us to send the notices, and the notices them-
selves and the mail. ... Q. And for the ttse of that money 
ymt made a charge of 1 per cent, is that correct? A. For the 
privilege of his having my furniture in his store I charged him 
1 per cent a month. Q. For the privilege of his having your 
furniture in h1:s store you charged him 1 per cent a month. 
A. That is right. Q. And is that 1 per cent-considerable 
of that 1 per cent, as you have testified, went into certain 
expenses? A. That is right. Q. Do you know how much of 
the 1 per cent went into actual expenses? A. Roughly, I 
would say about Y2 of 1 per cent. Q. That is about half of 
it? A. The other half, I would say, was profit." In other 
words the deal was to be by trust receipts and was to enable 
plaintiff to have furniture in his store-to finance him-to 
loan him money. 
It will be noted that frequent references are made to trust 
receipts. Both parties agreed that instruments called trust 
receipts were used. A notice that they were engaged in trust 
receipt transactions was filed with the Secretary of State 
as required by law. ( Civ. Code, § 3016.9.) The trust receipts, 
labelled by that name, were introduced into evidence. With 
everyth1:ng pointing to a trust receipt arrangement and noth-
ing to the contrary, the jury was told that if it was a trust 
receipt deal there was no usury-defendant could not re-
cover. I fail to see how the jury could escape being misled 
to the prejudice of plaintiff. The parties and the evidence 
told them the arrangement was a trust receipt one and then 
as a clincher the court commanded them to hold for defendants 
if trust receipts were used. This court said in Sebrell v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Corp., 31 Cal.2d 813, 817 [192 P .2d 898] : "In-
structions that are contradictory in essential elements may 
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warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground that it can-
not be ascertained whieh instruction was followed by the 
jury." 
[ would therefore reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15, 
1952. Carter, .J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21794. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1952.] 
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[la, lb] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Be-
half of Corporation.-By bringing a stockholder's derivative 
action the plaintiff nominates himself to act in a fiduciary 
capacity substantially as a guardian acl litem for the corpo-
ration, and he has no vested property right which compels 
the court to accept him unconditionally in that capacity. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-Corp. Code, § 834, pre~cribing the conditions pre-
cedent to maintenance of a stockholder's derivative action, is 
not desig·ned and does not operate to deprive a shareholder 
of any vestt>d property right. 
[3] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-Since Corp. Code, § 834, is directed only at actions 
instituted or maintained "in the right" of the corporation, 
it has no application to actions or suits seeking directly to 
enforce personal rights of shareholders. 
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-A stockholder does not bring an action on behalf of 
a corporation because his rights have been directly violated, 
or because the cause of action is his or because he is entitled 
to the relief sought; he is permitted to sue in this manner 
simply to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court. 
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-A stockholder who institutes an action on behalf of a 
corporation is a trustee, seeking in the name of another a re-
covery for wrongs which have been committed against that 
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